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I. CLASSIFICATION  
 
There is no law in Germany that regulates internal investigations. Perhaps more correct-
ly stated: there is no single specific law because there are indeed numerous statutory 
provisions applicable to internal investigations that must be observed. Nevertheless, 
these provisions are not combined into a single code. It would not be so bad if the rele-
vant statutory provisions were systematically organized, but because they are not, it is 
essential to understand which respective rules could potentially be applied, in which 
ways they relate to each other and to other rules, and finally, what specific content is 
contained in the applicable standards. 
 
Starting at the top of the hierarchy of norms is a view towards the constitution. Our 
Grundgesetz, often referred to in English as the Basic Law, permits all persons to do 
what they want so long as it is not expressly forbidden. Despite the flood of normative 
standards, there is no provision that prohibits curiosity. Anybody can investigate, 
whether it is a private detective, journalist, captain of industry, or even lawyer.1 The state 
does not hold a monopoly over investigations.2 Therefore, internal investigations are 
legal.3 However, this does not mean that everybody can exercise all conceivable means 
without limits and arbitrarily use all information.4  
II. SEPARATION BETWEEN INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AND OFFICIAL 




Looking at internal investigations as the repressive arm of compliance, then private in-
vestigations also tread similarly on the side of the state: specifically, judicial investiga-
tions and the classic investigation procedure of the prosecutor’s office. But this is noth-
ing special or new. In Germany, the principle of party presentation applies in civil pro-
ceedings, limiting also in proceedings before labor courts. Here, the law requires that the !!!
1
  Salvenmoser & Schreier, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht No. 15/24 & 25 (Achenbach et al. eds., 4th ed. 
2015); Bockemühl, in FS Beulke 647 (2015). 
2
  Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis No. 18/74 (Böttger ed., 2nd ed. 2015); see also Wehnert, 
StraFo 2012, 253 (254); Knierim, in Internal Investigations No. 15/157 (Knierem et al. eds., 2013); priority of 
state investigations, but no monopoly, see also Moosmayer, in Criminal Compliance  § 34 B, No. 74. (Rotsch 
ed., 2015).  
3
  Theile, Internal Investigations & Selbstbelastung, StV 381 (2011); Rotsch, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, 
supra note 1, at No. 1/4/60; see also Nestler, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 1/18; see also 
Rotsch, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 1, at No. 1/4/49.  
4
  See Salvenmoser & Schreier, supra note 1, at No. 15/40; for the admissibility and limits of state prosecution 
investigative activities after indictment, see Engländer & Zimmermann, FS Beulke 669 (2015).  
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party and acting lawyer present the facts of the case. However, this is only possible if the 
relevant facts are presented. Given the procedural obligation to truth and completeness 
found under Section 138 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nobody is allowed to simply 
declare what is favorable to his or her side, but must at least ensure the essentiality of the 
circumstances identified. Because the accused/defendant can turn to experts and inter-
view potential witnesses on his or her own, so too should the defense lawyer exercise this 
right.5 Nothing different applies to plaintiffs and their counsel. This is harmless as long 
as neither objective nor subjective manipulation of evidence arises. Internal investigators 
classify themselves in this manner6 and they can come from inland or abroad.7  
 
According to Article 92 of the Basic Law, judicial power is exclusively vested in judges. 
Sentencing is also reserved to judges. However, the existence of an investigation separate 
from the judiciary is not forbidden. The tasks of collecting evidence, clarifying facts, and 
deciding whether there should be a criminal case are the responsibility of the judiciary 
and are delegated according to constitutional categories to the Second Authority (ad-
ministration) and public prosecutor’s office (including their police investigators).8 The 
judiciary holds a monopoly over prosecution.9 Law enforcement by private investigators 
is fundamentally different from legal authorities because of the special intervention 
rights conferred on the state (e.g. search, seizure, surveillance of telecommunications, 
and compelling witnesses). In internal investigations, the information gained depends 
on whether, for example, the respondent was voluntarily questioned and the custodian 
of certain documents made them readily available. This applies even in cases where there 
is a legal duty to testify or surrender items.10 While a refusal may violate legal obligations 
(e.g. corporate or labor law), this can only be overcome through recourse to the courts 
!!!
5
  BGH, Urt. v. 10.2.2000 – 4 StR 616/99, No. 15 = BGHSt 46, 1; Wimmer, in FS Imme Roxin, 537, 539. 
6
  For an understanding of the term, see Salvenmoser & Schreier, supra note 1, at No. 15/13.  
7
  Matthias Jahn, Ermittlungen in Sachen Siemens/SEC: Legitimer Baustein des globalisierten Wirtschaftsstraf-
verfahrens oder rechtswidriges Parallelverfahren zur Strafprozeßordnung? – Eine Problemskizze, StV 41, 41-
42 (2009). Therein lies no circumvention of the provisions on international legal assistance in criminal mat-
ters because the private investigations are not carried out directly in a criminal procedure. See also Wastl et al., 
NStZ 68, 71 (2009); see also Rosen, BB 230 (2009); albeit contradictory, see Wehnert, NJW 1190-1191 (2009); 
Wehnert, FS Egon Müller 729; Wybitul, BB 606 (2009); for the situation in the U.S. see Behrens, RIW 22, 27 
(2009); Mengel & Ulrich, NZA 240 (2006).  
8
  Detailing the prosecutor’s position, see Carsten & Rautenberg, Die Geschichte der Staatsanwaltschaft in 
Deutschland bis zur Gegenwart 358, 503 (2d ed. 2012). 
9
  Exception: private action, §374 and the following, StPO (Code of Criminal Procedure). 
10
  Kirmes, WiJ 150 (2013). His demand for a legal basis for internal investigations may be a professional legal 
appeal to increase the quality of authority. But private investigators are carriers, not addressees, of fundamen-
tal rights. They would need an (expanding?) legal basis only for their actions for the purpose of transmitting 
intervention powers: but who would want that?   
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because there is no right to self-help in this area,11 as this is instead limited to other issues.  
 
Another crucial difference: in contrast to the justice department, internal investigators 
take on a party role.12 Of course, prosecutors and judges have their own self-interests. 
However, their official actions should not be based on these interests. They are required 
to scrutinize circumstances that might potentially show criminal relevance without re-
spect to the person involved and to legally evaluate the facts. In this sense, they must 
make their decisions in a neutral manner. This applies already at the outset of the inves-
tigation. The Code of Criminal Procedure also sets the necessary criteria for admission, 
including a clarification of coercive measures, as well as providing restrictions such as the 
conditions and scope of their permissible use. By contrast, internal investigators act 
under the mandate granted to them and are inevitably directed by a specific interest.13 
This applies even if the assignment is to gather information, regardless of its content, 
thereby gathering insights about operations and persons affected therefrom.14 The legal 
obligation of internal investigators to fulfill this goal extends only so far as the mandate 
and may therefore be limited or terminated at any time.15 In fact, an unlimited mandate 
often overlaps with the task of the state investigative authorities.16  
 
Even then, there can be no talk of parallelism considering the disparity of legal goals and 
the resources available for investigation. Only the justice department is subject to the 
obligation to respect the rights of everybody involved. They must comply meticulously 
with the procedural provisions. This becomes apparent in the obligations for instructing 
both witnesses and the accused. In civil and labor proceedings, there is an obligation to 
warn about rights, but this is only for the court. This does not extend to pretrial deposi-
tions made in private. These are subject to absolutely no previous duty to inform of 
rights.17 The Federal Bar Association18 recommends that its members (i.e. lawyers) make !!!
11
  Ex. § 229 BGB (German Civil Code). 
12
  Gädigk, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 18/20 & 27; FS Uwe H. Schneider 701, 706; Wehnert, 
StraFo 253-254 (2012); compare to Kort, FS Günther H. Roth 407 (2011).  
13
  Wehnert, StraFo 253-254 (2012); see also Knauer, ZWH 41, 47 (2012). 
14
  Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis, supra note 2, at No. 18/78 (rightly emphasizing the need for 
an objective clarification); see also Knauer, ZWH 81, 83 (2012). 
15
  Golombek, WiJ 162, 166 (2012)(correctly stressing that there is no duty to large scale internal investigations 
provided that appropriate resolution of the facts are guaranteed within the investigation); see also Knauer, 
ZWH 41, 47 (2012); Knierim, FS Volk 247; Reichert & Ott, ZIP 2173-2174 (2009); Potinecke &Block, in In-
ternal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 2, 157; for ad hoc measures upon notification of grievances, see Idler 
& Waeber, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at ch. 20. 
16
  There is no duty to bring charges as a result of internal investigations. See Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 
in der Praxis, supra note 2, at Rn. 18/2; Knauer, ZWH 41, 44 (2012); Kremer, FS Uwe H. Schneider 701, 713; 
Rübenstahl & Skoupil, WiJ 177 (2012). 
17
  Salvenmoser &Schreier, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 1, at No. 15/174.  
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the interviewees aware of their rights at the very beginning. This expresses the aspira-
tional goal of fairness. However, this is not binding from the outset on any other inter-
nal investigator such as an auditor, as it is not covering an official state duty. So what 
must the internal investigator warn about? It cannot be the mandatory criminal proce-
dural warnings, precisely because, as will be shown below,19 the respondents are legally 
obliged under labor and corporate law to disclose information, so they are not granted a 
right to remain silent.  
 
All of this speaks by no means against an internal investigation,20 but rather to the sig-
nificant differences when compared to criminal procedure.21 This has consequences.  It 
is a matter of different procedures. Rules and goals are in no way uniform and therefore 
automatically identical. The approach by both bodies is legally separate and independ-
ent of each other.22 To the extent that a legal obligation to perform an internal investiga-
tion exists,23 whether as a result of corporate law or from Section 13024 of the Act on 
Regulatory Offenses, the affected company must fulfill this duty. It does not matter if 
an additional criminal or civil investigation is conducted or not.  The same is true vice 
versa. To meet the statutory requirements, the prosecution takes up an investigation 
and the regulatory offense authority must decide upon their intervention after due con-
sideration. Each authority must therefore carry out its own duties, regardless of whether !!!
18
  See explanatory notes BRAK, Stellungnahme 2010/35, zum Unternehmensanwalt im Strafrecht, available at 
http://www.brak.de/zur-rechtspolitik/stellungnahmen-pdf/stellungnahmen-
deutschland/2010/november/stellungnahme-der-brak-2010-35.pdf (Nov. 2010).  
19
  See Section III, A. 
20
  For considerable skepticism, see Greeve, StraFo 89 (2013); Nieto Martin, in Compliance & Strafrecht 51 
(Kuhlen et al. eds. 2013). 
21
  Knauer, ZWH 41, 47 (2012); Momsen & Grützner, DB 1792 (2011). 
22
  Knauer, ZWH 41, 47, 81 (2012); Gädigk, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at 18/5 and 44; Kremer, FS 
Uwe H. Schneider 701;  Bung, ZStW 125 (2013); Theile, FS Kühne 489, 498 (2013). 
23
  Bock, Criminal Compliance 441 (2011); Knauer, ZWH 41, 46 (2012); Potinecke & Block, in Internal Investi-
gations, supra note 2, at No. 2/4; Grützner, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht No. 4/46 (Momsen & Grützner eds., 
2013); Salvenmoser & Schreier, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 1, at No. 15/36; Golombek, 
WiJ 162, 164 (2012)(emphasizing that the legal basis for the organizational duties of a manager are not found 
in Section 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offences, but rather in corporate law); see also Kindler, FS Günther 
H. Roth 367; Kindler, in Wissenschaftliche und praktische Aspekte der nationalen und internationalen 
Compliance-Diskussion 1 (Rotsch ed., 2012); Knierem, in Wissenschaftliche und praktische Aspekte der na-
tionalen und internationalen Compliance-Diskussion 77, 91 (Rotsch ed., 2012); Kuhlen, in Compliance & 
Strafrecht, supra note 20, at 11; Moosmayer, in Criminal Compliance, supra note 2, at No. 68; Reichert & 
Ott, ZIP 2173, 2174 (2009); Knierem, in Handbuch des Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrechts No. 5/114 (Wab-
nitz & Janovski eds., 4th ed. 2014); against the prevailing opinion, see Reichert & Ott, ZIP 2173, 2176 (2009); 
Golombek, WiJ 162, 167 (2012)(with regard to whether the clarification has a margin of discretion); see also 
Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis, supra note 2, at No. 6; Knauer, ZWH 81, 82 (2012); Kudlich 
& Wittig, ZWH 253, 303 (2013).  
24
  Concerning limited influence on organizational duties in the Group, OLG München, StraFo 82 (2015). 
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the other authorities are likewise doing so or not. The only basis for their own actions is 
the relevant regulations for their office.   
 
As it would be disallowed, an authority abstains from referencing an inquiry of its own 
activities led by the other side, and it rules out at face value the insights that were gained 
in the process because they were discovered through different standards and in pursuit 
of different purposes and interests. It is thus necessary in each respective case to accu-
rately clarify what significance is inherent in the other process.   
 
The duty of neutrality and the variety of goals and rules preclude a judicial privatization 
of law enforcement.25 Whether such a process would be sensible at all and how it would 
be legally and technically implemented remains an open question. In any event, only 
legislators are allowed to limit the hitherto unrestricted prosecutorial compulsion to 
investigate, for example, in cases of internal investigations. Also, the justice administra-
tion may not prevent criminal justice from having reference to the admissibility of in-
ternal investigations from their own inquiries. A statutory clause that leads to the sub-
sidiarity of the state in relation to private investigations cannot be easily inserted into 
prosecution law.  
 
The mixing of private and criminal investigations would also be deemed inappropriate 
because it is the task of the criminal justice system to pursue any offenses committed 
during the course of internal investigations. Violations of both the Privacy Act and oth-
er general criminal offenses (ex. Sections 201, 201a, and 240 of the Criminal Code) may 
be associated with private monitoring of mail correspondence, conversations, or sanitary 
facilities. Compliance is wielded for its part.26 Prosecutors could hardly investigate at 
ease due to the obvious dangers that accompany their inquiry.  
 
B.  Existing Opportunities for Cooperation 
 
1. Prosecutor’s Duty to Preserve Evidence  
 
An unlimited demand of independent procedure control corresponds to neither a ban !!!
25
  Gädigk, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 18/20 & 46; Jahn, ZWH 1, 6 (2013)(from the perspec-
tive of the defense, highlighting the ambivalence of such a partial privatization); Regarding search and seizure 
in the absence of cooperation, see BGH, Beschl. v. 23.1.2014 – KRB 48/13 = NZKart 2014, 236.  
26
  Bock, supra note 23, at 476; Wybitul, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at Ch. 11; Mengel, in Internal 
Investigations, supra note 2, at Ch. 13; Brockhaus, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at Ch. 26; Kuhlen, 
in Compliance & Strafrecht, supra note 20, at 22 & 24; Kuhlen & Maschmann, in Compliance & Strafrecht, 
supra note 20, at 85; Kuhlen & Sahan, in Compliance & Strafrecht, supra note 20, at 171; Grützner, in 
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 23, at No. 4/193; Knierem, in Handbuch des Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrechts supra note 23, at No. 5/134 & 4/412; Salvenmoser & Schreier, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, 
supra note 1, at 15/41; Rotsch, ZStW 125, 481 (2013). 
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on mutual consideration nor a coordinated approach.27 Both are permitted, albeit only 
within limits. Clear rules of the game are still lacking.  
 
The obligation to consider cooperation with the prosecutor’s office and to make an 
informed decision originates from the general duty of care that management possesses.28 
There is, however, no absolute requirement to cooperate with prosecutors under all 
circumstances.29  
 
Despite an ongoing internal investigation, prosecutors must not only carry out their 
own duty to investigate, but they must also fulfill their role as so-called leader of the 
process.30 Thus, nobody other than the prosecutor decides what is required for clearing 
up any suspicion of an alleged offense. The prosecution fulfills its obligation in a dutiful 
manner only when it is led by the need for best possible findings.31 This necessity cannot 
be shaken off. Exactly how the prosecutor is supposed to satisfy its task in a particular 
case is not described in detail and is not always the same for all similar cases. The investi-
gating authorities have flexibility in determining the responsibility of the prosecutor, 
while also taking account of the individual circumstances of the case.  
 
Although the judiciary must be consciously aware that the objectivity of internal inves-
tigations is not always self-evident and therefore requires professional distance and spe-
cial protection of the interests of individuals accused, it would be inappropriate to hold 
a complete institutional distrust of internal investigations and of the people who or-
dered or carried them out. The head of the legal department of a defense company 
found no suspicion against the company with an internal corruption investigation. 
However, the Federal Constitutional Court might decide this yet.32 The circumstances 
of the specific case are also relevant. If suspicion is directed against the Chief Executive 
Officer, then a cooperative approach will rarely be appropriate at the beginning of the 
investigation. Where it involves a question of self-enrichment of a senior employee be-!!!
27
  For reasons in favor of a cooperation from the perspective of a company, see Knierim, FS Volk, 247, 256; 
Knierem, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 15/185; Kremer, FS Uwe H. Schneider 701; Wehnert, 
StraFo 253, 254 (2012). For the perspective of a prosecutor, see Gädigk, in Internal Investigations, supra note 
2, at No. 18/20 & 44; For questions of corruption, see Hoven, WiJ 28 (2014). 
28
  Kremer, FS Uwe H. Schneider 701, 704. 
29
  Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis, supra note 2, at No. 69; Golombek, WiJ 162, 169 (2012); 
Knauer, ZWH 41, 44, 48 (2012); Potinecke & Block, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 2/184; 
Salvenmoser & Schreier, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 1, at No. 15/192; Grützner, in 
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 23, at No. 4/65, 142 & 4/458. 
30
  Wimmer, FS Imme Roxin 537, 551. See also BGH, Beschl. v. 23.1.2014 – KRB 48/13 = NZKart 2014, 236; 
Gädigk, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at Ch. 18.   
31
  Jahn, GA 588 (2014). 
32
  Such as in the case, BVerfG v. 13.3.2014 – 2 BvR 974/12 = NJW 2014, 1650. 
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low the highest level of leadership, then there is quite often a greater harmony between 
the interests of business and criminal justice.   
 
There are inevitably points of contact between large companies and the public prosecu-
tors that are responsible for them. Criminal offenses against such a company and result-
ing from it are fairly common. If a certain trust has developed as a result of cooperation33 
in previous cases (such an arrangement makes sense for compliance officers in large 
companies),34 it would still be naïve to put only this officer on a case. Nevertheless, it can 
be appropriate for the compliance officer to make an effort in the voluntary disclosure 
of information and documents.   
 
However, this is not mandatory. The public prosecutor is further authorized to take 
immediate action, despite prior good experiences, by utilizing measures to preserve evi-
dence, provided that there are sufficient substantive grounds. A belligerent initial de-
meanor is ruled out under such circumstances from the outset.  
 
Safeguarding the possibility of clarifying suspicion must be the guiding principle for the 
public prosecutor’s actions in each case. It is often imperative to take possession of es-
sential evidence. This includes both electronic data of the company concerned (per 
backup copy), as well as all relevant documents (the most important in original form, 
others as a photocopy, perhaps also drafts and different versions). It is generally possible 
for only the public prosecutor to review the results of existing or later initiated internal 
investigations for whatever the case may be.   
 
The public prosecutor’s approach is further influenced by whether internal investiga-
tions are already under way when the initial suspicion is raised and the extent to which 
they have progressed. It may be opportune to inquire about this if a sufficient founda-
tion of trust has been established. If the internal investigations are coming to an end or 
were already completed, the public prosecutor can make its own actions dependent on 
whether the present investigation results are made accessible promptly, completely, and 
under permission of review from the company. Potential irregularities, inconsistencies, 
gaps, or biases can be shown during examination of the disclosed material. Responses to 
inquiries and demands to submit further documents demonstrate how seriously the 
company considers the entire process.  
 
The prosecution must pursue any remaining doubts. They must not destroy the peace-
ful atmosphere that has been developed in their relationship, although the affected 
company will not greet the use of criminal procedural means of coercion with approval. !!!
33
  For cooperation outside concrete procedures, see Kremer, FS Uwe H. Schneider 701, 712. 
34
  Kremer, FS Uwe H. Schneider 701, 714. 
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Moreover, they should exhaust the investigative measures provided under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure only with serious and practically necessary reason.  
 
If the public prosecutor refrained from finding out from the affected company whether 
internal investigations were conducted because of a particular set of circumstances, then 
it expresses an existing mistrust that is indeed quite normal, provided there are objective 
reasons for this. In such a situation (as in any normal case), clarifications may be re-
quired of things that are not yet readily revealed in pending investigations. Whether 
prosecution must subsequently use coercive actions or whether the incoming infor-
mation makes it much more possible to cooperatively approach the company depends 
on the progress of the discovery process. Along these lines, the company’s behavior is 
also a crucial factor in determining the prosecution’s further actions in the case. The 
leeway here is not only restricted to the dualism of cooperating trust versus coercive use, 
but also extends to steps such as a possible coordination of internal and criminal proce-
dural investigations.  
 
2. Evidence Abroad 
 
Cooperation with the company and its internal investigators is most effective for the 
public prosecutor when the necessary evidence is not readily available for state authori-
ties. That is often the case when documents or servers are located abroad. Even if it can 
be expected that the country in question would provide legal assistance, this seldom 
happens within a short period of time. In the stage between knowledge of suspicion and 
gaining the ability to obtain evidence across borders, the abstract opportunity exists for 
the company’s employees to destroy or manipulate relevant information without good 
intention. This means that it is practically impossible to ensure the reliability of evi-
dence. In light of this, it is usually appropriate to accept the declared willingness of vol-
untary production. The following inevitable examination of the probative value does 
not constitute any special peculiarity of voluntarily produced evidence.  
 
3. Taking Evidence from Large Companies 
 
It is not just the realm of evidence from abroad that provides far-reaching opportunities 
for cooperation. Relevant information from a large company is often found concentrat-
ed in a particular location. To gather all of this information at once is hardly possible.  
This leaves room for suppression of evidence. There is often no fear of additional sub-
stantial hindrance of the investigation of facts if the public prosecutor initially offers the 
company the opportunity to submit evidence. With such wholehearted disclosure, it 
acquires the chance to avoid the disadvantages associated with a potential intensive 
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search for evidence.35  
 
If there is evidence of further substantial and relevant material despite the voluntary 
surrender of documents, the prosecutor must pursue this in a manner dictated by the 
circumstances. This might be extremely unpleasant for the company, such as what 
Deutsche Bank experienced in the winter of 2012-2013: according to reports in the daily 
press,36 they only produced selected documents associated with an investigation of tax 
evasion in the context of the trading of carbon certificates. As a result, the justice de-
partment launched a full-blown search operation by utilizing a large contingent of po-
lice officers through the deployment of a helicopter and also through the underground 
parking garage.  
 
The prosecution is free to coordinate its own approach to the company and to the inves-
tigators engaged, provided that it deems the exploration for truth as secure.  Under this 
condition, the prosecution is authorized to defer all or part of its own investigations. 
The prosecution may allow precedence to the internal investigation, but only under its 
own securing of the evidence and if it remains in constant close contact with the compa-
ny. Required preservation of evidence nevertheless continues without delay, regardless 
of whether it is in inaccessible locations for the company. If the internal investigators 
lead the prosecution to such sources, this demonstrates their interest and seriousness in 
cooperating.  
 
The problem of quantity is not greater in comparison to investigations led solely by 
public prosecutors. To the contrary, relief can occur because company-based personnel 
or internal investigators turn over documents or they answer questions so comprehen-
sively that the prosecutor can more quickly develop the connections needed for a case.    
 
4. Prosecution’s Instructions to Postpone Internal Investigations 
 
According to Moosmayer,37 the criminal justice department has the right to stop the 
internal investigation, at least temporarily. However, a legal basis for such an arrange-
ment is not clearly evident. It is not expressly included in Section 258 of the Criminal 
Code. Adequate social contacts are not themselves suitable factual actions, even in the 
!!!
35
  BGH, Beschl. v. 23.1.2014 – KRB 48/13 = NZKart 2014, 236. 
36
  E.g. DPA, Deutsche Bank: der kriminelle Handel mit CO2-Zertifikaten, Zeit Online, Dec. 13, 2012 at 2:05 
pm, http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2012-12/deutsche-bank-umsatzsteuerbetrug. 
37
 Moosmayer, in Criminal Compliance, supra note 2, at No. 34 B/74 (note: Moosmayer is head of the compli-
ance department of Siemens, Munich); See also Knierem, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 
15/167.   
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event of thwarting success.38 This is particularly true for legally necessary actions. Inter-
nal investigations at least tend to be by-the-book matters. Leading them is commonly 
the core legal obligation of the company. However, they deserve no unrestricted priori-
ty,39 even before the uptake of public prosecutorial investigations. It is foreseeable that 
only the use of the prosecutor’s investigative powers promises the clarification of suspi-
cions, as the company’s requirement to resolve facts is often possible only through en-
gagement of the prosecution. It is therefore logical, of course, not to endanger the suc-
cess of the full investigation through its own actions and this may require pausing the 
internal investigation. Even if its continuation may be permissible, one might still deny 
the reliability of the investigation if it is evident that the evidence gathered was influ-
enced or defeated in any shape or form. One might see an obstruction of justice if an 
internal investigation continues to be carried out alone and against the wishes of the 
public prosecutor. In specific cases, this continuation of the internal investigation might 
be done solely for public relations purposes.  
 
If the company does not wish to endanger an existing or desired relationship of profes-
sional trust through a confrontation with the prosecutor, it will therefore not ignore the 
prosecutor’s request to pause the internal investigation. In most cases, this will be a 
temporary demand and/or be limited to certain areas. If it is assumed that the accused 
does not know the suspicions levied against them, then it is in the mutual interest of the 
company and the law enforcement agencies to allow initial access to the public prosecu-
tor. It may be appropriate to suspend internal investigations if surprise evidence-taking 
actions are foreseen outside the company. 
 
To avoid unnecessary legal disadvantages,40 the company will express its interest and the 
prosecutor may submit its request in writing after waiting for the internal investigations. 
They will comply with this without having to pronounce a ban (although the company 
would prefer this). It is in its own interests for the company to record in writing the 
considerations affecting its decision and immediately send this to the prosecutor. In the 
event of an actual pause for possible liability and/or protection against unfair dismissal 
of an employee or member of the board, the company thus creates tangible proof that 
its actions were guided by the pursuit of the best possible investigation. That should be 
sufficient to protect against any legal harm, especially since the statutory time limit for 
termination (Section 626 German Civil Code) begins to run only after knowledge of the 
allegations and prosecutorial actions hold their own further clarification measures and 
are more reliable. Even in the case of the continuation of its own investigation, the com-!!!
38
  Fischer, StGB, 62nd ed. 2015, § 258 StGB No. 7. 
39
  Knierem, in Handbuch des Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrechts, supra note 23, at No. 5/117.   
40
  Moosmayer, in Criminal Compliance, supra note 2, at No. 34 B/75; see also Rotsch, Criminal Compliance vor 
den Aufgaben der Zukunft 3, 16 (2013). 
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pany should immediately disclose this to the prosecutor and detail the underlying rea-
sons because such openness brings everything into accord.   
 
5. Postponement of Prosecutorial Investigations 
 
If it appears that the search for truth is guaranteed, the public prosecutor must not only 
take the internal investigation into consideration, but must also set out the legal basis for 
discontinuation. As a state body, it is bound by the prohibition on excessiveness. There-
fore, it may only resort to coercion if this is necessary to fulfill its tasks. An accuracy 
check does not take place in view of the principle of free design of the investigation. 
Leeway is not given for free to the public prosecutor, but is only granted after its obliga-
tory professional judgment is met. Whether or not it is complying with the limits set out 
by law is judicially verifiable all the way up to the Constitutional Court. The established 
doctrine comes from fundamental rights and is further developed out of documentation 
and justification obligations.41 It represents an effective filter from keeping the investiga-
tive authorities away from using illegal coercive measures because it is unnecessary to 
employ. This legal compulsion to a proportionate approach is supported in fact by legal 
resources. Even if there is just a temporary passiveness in the interest of clarification, it is 
legal for a public prosecutor to await the outcome of an internal investigation.  
 
6. Testing Probative Value of an Internal Investigation’s Findings  
 
Reports, evidence submitted, and other findings of internal investigations are subject to 
the prosecution’s own careful review. Their intensity is variable. It is necessary to at least 
have a conclusiveness test and a clarification of whether the results are consistent with 
other findings. This control is needed even when the accused has confessed because it 
might be possible that this was a false confession and/or a scapegoat was given so as to 
hide the real culprits. Here, there must be no deviations from procedures unrelated to 
internal investigations: in each case, the prosecutor must make its own preliminary as-
sessment. The hypothesis must then withstand any confrontation with all respective 
findings. Each bit of information is comprehensively assessed and placed in the context 
of other findings. The point at which the hypothesis solidifies to a sufficient ground for 
suspicion varies in each individual case. It is essential that the conceptual meaning of the 
given evidence remain.  However, the circumstances of their collection and the handling 
of those involved in the allegations of the proceedings plays a significant role.  
!!!
41
  For evidence supporting the search, see Schmitt, StPO No. 3 & 5 (Meyer-Goßner & Schmitt eds., 58th ed. 
2015); The German Constitutional Court stresses the importance of documentation, especially in the follow-
ing judgments: 19.3.2013 – 2 BvR 2628/10, 2 BvR 2883/10, 2 BvR 2155/11 = BVerfGE 133, 168, in particular No. 
80 & 114. 
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III.  ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW  
 
A. Duty to Give Evidence 
 
Whether employees in Germany are required to testify to private investigators in ac-
cordance with German law depends on the circumstances. In the case of employees, it is 
usually German labor law that applies,42 while company law is generally relevant for 
members of the representative and supervising bodies. For the most part, the results of 
both branches of law do not differ.  
 
1. Duty to Give Information based on an Employment Contract 
 
The employment contract, constituting a special form of a service contract (Section 611 
of the Civil Code), requires a mutual exchange of information.43 If one side requires 
information that the other side has, there is a valid claim to be informed so long as the 
party that knows the information can easily share it.44 If this information can be found 
elsewhere (ex. through third parties or resulting from the content of documents), then 
the party lacks sufficient need to obtain this information from the other party.45 The 
legal basis for disclosure requirements is found in Sections 611 and 241, Paragraph 2 of 
the Civil Code, and possibly in conjunction with Section 242 of the Civil Code.46 Their 
scope varies and is at the widest with executive powers.47 For business transactions, Sec-
tion 675, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides specific additional information, as well 
as Sections 662 and 666 of the Civil Code.48 This provision standardizes the duty of the 
representative to communicate required information. Outside of labor law, company 
law also leads to comparable results. Refusal49 to supply information can lead to a com-
!!!
42
  Consideration of the participation rights of the works council is irrelevant to the topic treated here. There 
will thus be no discussion of the collective labor law.  
43
  Greeve, StraFo 89, 94 (2013); Thüsing, § 611 BGB No. 242 (Henssler et al. eds.); Bock & Gerhold, in Internal 
Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 5/41; Rödiger, Strafverfolgung von Unternehmen, Internal Investigations 
und strafrechtliche Verwertbarkeit von Mitarbeitergeständnissen 258 (2012); Wehnert, Strafo, 253, 256 (2012). 
44
  BAG, Urt. v. 18.1.1996 – 6 AZR 314/95 = NZA 1997, 41; BAG, Urt. v. 7.9.1995 – 8 AZR 828/93 = NZA 1996, 
637; Thüsing, § 611 BGB No. 242 (Henssler et al. eds.).  
45
  Imme Roxin, StV 116 (2012). 
46
  Wastl et al., NStZ 68, 70 (2009). 
47
  BAG, Urt. v. 13.3.1964 – 1 AZR 100/63 = AP Nr. 32 zu § 611 BGB Haftung des Arbeitnehmers; Göpfert et al., 
NJW 1703, 1706 (2008). 
48
  Göpfert et al., NJW 1703, 1705 (2008); Momsen & Grützner, DB 1792, 1795 (2011); Thüsing, § 611 BGB No. 
242 (Henssler et al. eds.); Wastl et al., NStZ 68, 70 (2009); Wybitul, BB 606, 610 (2009). 
49
  For possible labor law consequences, see Göpfert et al., NJW 1703, 1706 (2008). 
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plaint at a labor or other ordinary court.50 This is enforceable through setting a fine or 
detention, pursuant to Section 888, Paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.51 In 
addition, claims for damages can be made.52  
 
2. No Exception for Risk of Self-Incrimination  
 
There is no duty to one’s own self-incrimination53 or to the disclosure of facts that could 
lead to termination.54 According to case law, the obligation to disclose information re-
fers to the context of necessity,55 but also at its own professional misconduct or even 
criminal actions.56 Companies partially try to facilitate the fulfillment of their obligation 
to provide information to those affected. Amnesty programs speak of a waiver of repres-
sion.57 It is important to note that this does not extend to the prosecution. Responsibil-
ity for this lies only with the prosecutor’s office. This is especially true as far as the prin-
ciple of legality goes.58 Its breach is allowed to the prosecutor only in exceptional circum-
stances and within legally permitted limits, but never to third parties.  
 !!!
50
  Wastl et al., NStZ 68, 73 (2009). Not quite conclusively advocating the labor court’s jurisdiction for the legal 
protection of an employee against an action initiated by a foreign public authority. Apart from the fact that 
the administrative courts would prefer to have jurisdiction, it lacks the need for legal protection: The official 
action itself encroaches on nobody’s rights and private investigators do not exercise official action therefrom. 
On the other hand, labor courts are quite interested in the right of the employee to non- or limited disclosure 
of information on behalf of the employer and therefore also by the privately mandated investigators. 
51
  The enforcement ban of Sec. 888, Para. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure only applies to the main duty, i.e. 
for the work performance as such. 
52
  BAG, Urt. v. 21.11.2000 – 3 AZR 13/00 = NZA 2002 (claims for damages relating to the lack of information 
about entitlement to benefits). 
53
  BGH, Urt. v. 23.2.1989 – IX ZR 236/86 = NJW-RR 1989, 614 (615). 
54
  BAG, Urt. v. 7.9.1995 – 8 AZR 828/93 = NZA 1996, 637; see also Göpfert et al., NJW 1703, 1708 (2008). 
55
  Imme Roxin, StV 116 (2012); Knauer, ZWH 81, 85 (2012). 
56
  BGH, Urt. v. 30.4.1964 – VII ZR 156/62 = AP Nr. 11 zu § 242 BGB Auskunftspflicht (zu § 260 BGB); BAG, 
Urt. v. 27.9.1988 – 3 AZR 59/87 = NZA 1989, 467; VG Frankfurt, Beschl. v. 28.8.2000 – 23 L 1642/00 (V) = 
HessVGRspr 2001, 51; Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis, supra note 2, at No. 132; Greeve, 
StraFo 89, 95 (2013); Momsen & Grützner, DB 1792, 1795 (2011); Rödiger, supra note 43, at 294; Wehnert, 
StraFo 253, 256 (2012); Wimmer, FS Imme Roxin 537, 540; Bung, ZStW 125, 536, 548 (2013); Imme Roxin, StV 
116, 121 (2012); Tscherwinka, FS Imme Roxin 521; Wastl et al., NStZ 68, 70 (2009); Böhm, WM 1923 (2009); 
Zerbes, ZStW 125, 551, 559 (2013); Salvenmoser & Schreier, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 1, 
at No. 15/174; Mengel, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 13/37; Beckemper, in Internal Investi-
gations, supra note 2, at 15/245; Rieble, ZIP 1273 (2003). 
57
  Göpfert et al., NJW 1703, 1704 (2008); Knauer, ZWH 81, 84 (2012); Potinecke & Block, in Internal Investiga-
tions, supra note 2, at No. 2/168; Leisner, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at Ch. 9; Mengel, in Inter-
nal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 13/65; Wastl et al., NStZ  68, 71 (2009).  
58
  That is indisputable. See Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis, supra note 2, at No. 130; Kremer, 
FS Uwe H. Schneider 701, 708; Grützner, in in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 23, at No. 4/404.  
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The broad duty to disclose information to the company is not only questioned in labor 
law, but it must also resist fundamental concerns: much literature, that is also the view-
point of many young scholars, focuses on each conceivable interest of criminal justice 
relating to the findings of internal investigations and concludes with a forward dis-
placement of criminal procedural protection standards in labor law. However, the ex-
tent of such transfers varies. The asserted commitments of the company to law en-
forcement purposes are established.59 Labor law is thus partially regarded as substantive 
criminal procedure law.  
 
The need for any transfers of any criminal procedural rules protecting the accused to 
labor law stands and falls with the validity of the starting point of the discussion. In this 
regard, it is held that the function to assist criminal investigations is not the only motiva-
tion that leads to the performance of an internal investigation. Whoever bases his or her 
argument on this aspect alone is diminishing the problem. As already mentioned, the 
duty of launching an internal investigation was originally rooted in civil and corporate 
law obligations. The company is also subject to an obligation to shape its activities so 
that criminal offenses are avoided at all costs. This obligation is already legally secure. 
Management must provide proper organization. If they violate this duty, they fulfill 
Section 130 of the Act on Regulatory Offences. The violation is also attributed to the 
company itself, in addition to punishment in accordance with Section 30 of the Act on 
Regulatory Offences. In the case of a causal occurring violation of a legally protected 
interest, the principal’s liability in criminal law comes into play.60 In addition, the com-
pany has to consider whether it is entitled to liability claims. If that is the case and these 
claims are recoverable, then it must enforce them. Otherwise, the members of its compe-
tent bodies are committing a criminal breach of trust. It is therefore in the overriding 
interests of the company and its own institutions to recognize and enforce vulnerabili-
ties and any possible liability claims: in general, that means to carry out internal investi-
gations.  
 
Cooperation with the public prosecutor’s office is seen as a side effect and certainly 
changes nothing regarding the existence of its own obligations of the company and insti-
tutions. If the relationship between a criminal procedural approach and internal investi-
gations is designed in a manner such as what has been stated above, it may be an obliga-
tion of the company to not seriously disclose information for investigative purposes.  
 
It would be naïve to assume that no such attempts are made (by all accounts, at least in 
the U.S. too). That does not force into question fundamental German legal decisions !!!
59
  Zerbes, ZStW 125 (2013)(very engaging as well as one-sided); Anders, wistra 329 (2014)(differentiating and 
reducing the actual approach of the prosecutorial action); similarly, see also Greco & Caracas, NStZ 7 (2015). 
60
  For an expert and precise summary, see Roxin, FS Beulke 239 (2015). 
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such as the difference between labor and criminal law. Where the cooperation between 
prosecutors and companies purposefully or even inevitably leads to the devaluation of 
the criminal procedural rights of the employees, then this of course cannot enjoy the 
protection of the legal system.61  
 
The company can determine (in accordance with Section 241, Paragraph 2 or Section 242 
of the Civil Code)62 to which individual or board it will give information. Conceivable 
possibilities are the executive body, one of its members, the immediate supervisor, or the 
internally competent department, such as the compliance department, as well as external 
private investigators. The scope of the information disclosure shall be determined in 
each individual case. If the information is sufficient, then the claim is limited.  
 
One of the prevailing opinions (concerning labor- and company law obligations to dis-
close) is revealed in a study from the University of Konstanz,63 which found that the 
practice of refraining from taking statements (often self-incriminating) is enforced with 
the available legal means of coercion. However, no normative meaning can be attributed 
to this finding.64 The reserved use of coercive measures should be based on the notion 
that legal process promises no quick and usually only doubtful success. The practice of 
criminal justice is not influenced by the compulsion of witness testimony, but one 
would think that this might be the case due to legal reasons or the normative constraints 
of the relevant provisions.  
 
3. Multiple Parties 
 
If the obligation to disclose information in the context of an internal investigation were 
to involve more than one person, then this naturally leads to the question of whether 
the duty to disclose information also extends to the names of the additional people in-
volved. The respective legitimate interest of the company is essential. It is therefore im-
portant to determine if it is sufficient to present the facts as such (ex. in terms of ob-
struction, whether a bribe payment was procured) so that it requires no further 
knowledge by other individual parties. If the company wants to separate itself from 
employees involved in illegal transactions or if it wants to request damages, then the 
obligation to disclose information extends (at least in serious cases) to the names of 




  For possible solutions de lege lata, see below number 2.  
62
  Göpfert et al., NJW 1703, 1706 (2008).  
63
  Theile, ZIS 378 (2013); see also Theile, FS Kühne 489, 490, 497 (2013). 
64
  Theile, ZIS 378, 382 (2013).  
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B. Utilization in Investigatory and Criminal Proceedings  
 
In investigations and criminal proceedings, the accused65 may remain silent (nemo ten-
etur se ipsum accusare). This naturally also applies to employees and members of differ-
ent bodies within the company. According to Section 55 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, a witness may refuse to provide information in parallel criminal proceedings 
against another person accused of the same facts if this testimony might come back to 
harm the witness. The same is true in a civil proceeding (Section 384, Number 2 Code of 
Civil Procedure) and also in a labor court proceeding (Section 46, Paragraph 2, Sentence 
1 Labor Court Act).66 This right to remain silent would be virtually non-existent if pri-
vate investigators were to use duly effected statements against the employee or board 
member that were produced through questioning or reading aloud of protocols drafted 
by them.  
 
1. Solving the Conflict Based on the Principles of the Common Debtor Decision   
 
a. Comparability of the Situations 
 
The exclusion of evidence improperly obtained67 could follow from a well-known in-
solvency decision of the Constitutional Court, hereinafter referred to as the common 
debtor decision. 68 Consequently, the constitutionally guaranteed right against self-
incrimination only applies in investigations and criminal proceedings.69 By contrast, an 
obligation to give information is constitutionally unobjectionable in other areas of law 
(ex. insolvency law).  However, the enforceable and unlimited obligation to give infor-
mation corresponds to a constitutional but dispensable prohibition on the utilization of 
evidence received in an investigation and criminal proceeding against the respondent.  
 
b. Fairness Principle 
 
It is disputed whether the conflict between an obligation to a truthful disclosure to the 
company and the criminal procedural right to remain silent can be solved on the basis of 
the principles of the common debtor decision. A difference is that the obligation to !!!
65
  For individual defense, see Litzka, WiJ 79 (2012).  
66
  Diller, DB 313 (2004)(questioning how and whether an employee must support his employer during pro-
ceedings through disclosure, handing over tax documents, or appearing in court). 
67
  Salvenmoser & Schreier, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 1, at No. 15/69 (dealing with the 
utilization of information illegally obtained during the course of an internal investigation and confirming a 
limited prohibition). 
68
  BVerfG, Beschl. v. 13.1.1981 – 1 BvR 116/77 = BVerfGE 56, 37 ff.; Mayer, StRR 124 (2015). 
69
  Rogall, FS Beulke 973 (2015); Wastl et al., NStZ 68, 70 (2009). 
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disclose information under the Insolvency Statute finds its legal basis in public proce-
dure law, while private law applies between the employer and employee. In particular 
Knauer70 and Momsen/Grützner71 reject the application of the principles enunciated in 
the common debtor decision and they find justification for their solution in the fair trial 
principle. But before resorting to a general principle, there is an attempt to develop a 
legally certain solution from the written law.  
 
c. Fundamental Rights Binding only for Official Actions 
 
The relationship between private individuals does not constitute a legal vacuum. It is 
defined by rules that, although partially modifiable, are designed to be stringent. These 
rules not only obtain legal binding nature on account of their own personal capacity, 
but first on account of their official state recognition (respectively, through legislation). 
Whether a private entity will want to agree on something is solely a matter for the par-
ties involved. If they have chosen to do so, state law applies insofar as they have not legit-
imately waived it. This is at least relevant for the “how” of legally binding relationships 
between private parties. The authority of state regulation flows from the constitution 
and the content is not free from obligations: even the freedom of the legislator finds 
itself limited by its requirement to preserve fundamental rights. In the field of civil law, 
they apply a protective function. Although this leaves vast space, that does not change 
the fact that the state must recognize the legal situation between private parties in a con-
stitutionally sound manner. Even under private law, the right to request information is 
based not only on an autonomous interest, but also to a considerable degree on official 
state action.  
 
Additionally, a claim (governed by public law) to information in an insolvency proceed-
ing is inconceivable without private action: there is no crisis without private sector activ-
ity. An insolvency proceeding primarily serves no public policy purpose, but is led by 
the interest of creditors. Momsen and Grützner72 consider only the enforcement. In this 
respect, it is true that the state merely provides the tools at its disposal, as the legal rela-
tionship continues to concern private parties. However, this says nothing about the role 
of the state in the existence of privately binding relationships: just as it is the state that is 
permitted to make substantive law binding, it is also up to the state to determine the 
conditions for the enforcement of this substantive law. The assertion that state help will 
not change anything concerning the private nature of the legal relationship between 
employer and employee is thus equally true as the conclusion drawn by Momsen and !!!
70
  Knauer, ZWH 81, 86 (2012); Knauer &Gaul, NStZ 192 (2013). 
71
  Momsen & Grützner, DB 1792, 1796 (2011); Momsen, in Criminal Compliance, supra note 2, at No. 34B/30 
&39. 
72
  Momsen & Grützner, DB 2011, 1792 (1795). 
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Grützner. The difference between the information under the Insolvency Statute and 
according to the employment contract is only in the different amount (qualitative and 
possibly also quantitative) of private cause. Consequently, a structural difference that 
would preclude the transfer of principles from the common debtor decision does not 
exist.   
 
This alone does not exclude any other potential significant differences. The courts have 
dealt with similar tensions in other circumstances. In each civil proceeding, the parties 
have the obligation to be truthful (Section 138, Paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure). With respect to insurance, the insured person must also provide truthful infor-
mation. If he or she fails to do so, then he or she faces punishment for fraud. However, 
there is no evidence exclusionary rule for insurance and civil records.73 What is a sustain-
able and accessible generalization of classification criterion? 
 
d. Duties and Obligations  
 
Procedural law distinguishes between enforceable obligations and mere procedural bur-
dens.74 Substantively, there is a parallel to duties on the one hand and obligations on the 
other hand. Duties are binding and their fulfillment is enforceable. However, the ad-
dressee of a procedural burden or substantive obligation can choose between fulfillment 
or acquiescence of the legal disadvantages that befall him or her. Indeed, the duty to be 
truthful is not available as such in a civil proceeding. The parties are in control: the pri-
vate plaintiff is not required to instigate a trial, and the respondent is not required to 
defend.  
 
A respondent does not have to defend against a claim for issuing information. He or she 
cannot ensure a right to silence. On the contrary, the substantive claim is precisely fo-
cused on the issuance of information: a duty that is documented in the court decision as 
an enforceable duty to express oneself truthfully. The following relates to employees 
and board members with respect to internal investigations: insofar as they are obliged to 
provide information, they lack the freedom to decide whether they want to testify or 
remain silent. The refusal is unlawful; the statement can be compelled by means of state 
enforcement. Accordingly, one can also find criteria regarding the duty to testify in the 
common debtor decision: there is a lack of freedom to decide in this specific situation.75 
It exists neither for the debtor in insolvency proceedings nor with a duty to disclose 
information according to substantive civil law. The legal consequence is therefore con-!!!
73
  Not clear, OLG Celle, Urt. v. 16.2.1982 – 1 Ss 605/81 = wistra 1982, 120. 
74
  ZPO No. 56 (Musielak ed.); see also MüKo/ZPO No. 32 (Rauscher ed.). 
75
  BGH, Beschl. v. 15.12.1989 – 2 StR 167/89, Rn. 14 f. = BGHSt 36, 328 ff; Böhm, WM 1913 (2009) , 1913; Wastl 
et al., NStZ 68, 71 (2009); Schlothauer, FS Gerhard Fezer 267.  
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gruent: the duty to private disclosure therefore corresponds to a criminal procedural 
evidence exclusionary rule.76  
 
e. Scope of the Prohibition on Utilization  
 
Although the ban on utilization is affirmed, there is little said about its scope. It goes 
without saying that it applies only with respect to correct information because untrue 
statements are never based on the fulfillment of a duty.77 The same applies to infor-
mation beyond the legal duty. False and voluntary information are freely usable in crim-
inal procedure.78  
 
f. Prohibition on Utilization  
 
The further limits of utilization correspond to the rules laid down in the common debt-
or decision: the conviction of the respondent must not be directly based on their dutiful 
statements, which means that an indirect use of such information is allowed at one’s 
own risk. However, the Basic Law does not stipulate indirect usability, but leaves the 
legislators free to decide whether or not to institute a further restriction. As a result of 
this possibility, the legislators have created Section 97, Paragraph 1, Sentence 3 of the 
Insolvency Statute. By contrast, there is no such provision for internal investigations. 
Thus, only the constitutional minimum applies. For this reason, law enforcement is not 
denied the opportunity to include statements made within the realm of an internal in-
vestigation when proceeding with a further investigation against the person who initial-
ly made the statement. Indeed, the independent evidence collected in the state investiga-
tion may form the basis of the conviction.79 In Germany, there is thus no ban on using 
evidence resulting from the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree. 
 
g. Validity Only for One’s Own Statements  
 
The scope of the utilization ban in the case of multiple parties is to be determined in !!!
76
  ArbG Saarlouis, Urt. v. 19.10.1983 – 1 Ca 493/83 = ZIP 1984, 364; Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der 
Praxis, supra note 2, at No. 144; Bock & Gerhold, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 5/41; 
Grützner, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 23, at No. 4/429; Momsen, in Criminal Compliance, supra 
note 2, at No. 34 B/30; LAG Rheinland-Pfalz, Urt. v. 7.9.2004 – 11 Sa 2018/03, No. 73; Bauer, StraFo 488 
(2012); Gädigk, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 18/29; Raum, StraFo 395, 397 (2012); Wimmer, 
FS Imme Roxin 537, 542; Rosen, BB 230, 231 (2009). 
77
  Verfassungsgerichtshof des Freistaates Sachsen, Beschl. v. 15.11.2013 – Vf. 89-IV-12. 
78
  § 97, Para. 1, Pg. 3 InsO; Bittmann & Rudolph, wistra 81 (2001). 
79
  Böhm, WM 1913 (2009); Rotsch, in Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra note 1, at No. 1/4/61; Rödiger, 
supra note 43, at 304; Wastl et al., NStZ 68, 73 (2009); Wehnert, StraFo 253, 257 (2012); Greco & Caracas, 
NStZ 7, 15 (2015); Stam, StV 130, 133 (2015); Rogall, FS Beulke 973, 978-980 (2015). 
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each instance: in proceedings against the respondent, it extends to the parts of the in-
formation dealing with the role of third parties if this, as in most cases, can allow conclu-
sions at the expense of the respondents.80 The situation is different in proceedings 
against an additional party. In this respect, it is not about self-incrimination. Therefore, 
such a personal evidentiary ban can only operate with the result that it does not apply in 
proceedings against a third party. If separate proceedings are initiated, this means that 
one’s own personal statements are unusable. Statements of others that were made dur-
ing the course of internal investigations are also unusable when they themselves are im-
puted to the person who made the self-incriminating statement. The exclusionary rule 
has therefore only a relative and very limited benefit. If there is a recognized need for 




1. Seizure and Freedom from Seizure 
 
There is no provision that expressly deals with the ability to seize documents that have 
originated during the course of the internal investigation. It must therefore be decided 
in accordance with general provisions. It depends initially on who led the internal inves-
tigation. If the right to refuse to give evidence does not extend to this person, then the 
documents are fully capable of being seized. Documents from inquiries made by com-
pany employees (ex. internal auditors, compliance department, in-house lawyers) can be 
easily seized. The same applies to investigations from a specialized company (ex. a foren-
sic firm). If an accounting firm is commissioned, the following are conceivable: a right to 
refuse to give evidence according to Section 53, Paragraph 1, Number 3 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and subsequently the seizure protection pursuant to Section 97, 
Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, this protection extends only 
to information and documents that were revealed to them in their professional capacity 
as auditors. It applies to business inspections, in particular financial statements,81 but 
not for internal investigations (unless they fall under protected activities in such a way 
that it makes it impossible to separate the sources). Compiled business records, as well as 
protocols of statements (interviews) and interim- and final reports drawn up by investi-
gators are capable of seizure even if they were procured from abroad.  
 
The situation is more nuanced if a lawyer led the investigation. Because an internal in-
vestigation does not concern a non-professional action, then Section 97, Paragraph 1 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure applies. This provision extends only to documents in !!!
80
  Senge, KK-StPO, § 55 StPO No. 10; Ignor & Bertheau, § 55 StPO No. 11, & 16; Schmitt, supra note 41, at § 55 
StPO No. 7; Rogall, SK-StPO, § 55 No. 27. 
81
  OLG Nürnberg, NJW 690 (2010), No. 13, in reference to Sec. 2, Para. 1 WiPrO. 
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the custody of the person who holds the right of refusal (Section 97, Paragraph 2, Sen-
tence 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and so it does not apply to documents stored 
in the company itself or easily accessible to the company. In addition, the attorney-client 
privilege (also referred to as legal professional privilege) exists solely between the lawyer 
and company as such.82 Employees of the company are not included within the scope of 
this protection. Accordingly, only the company can waive the confidentiality existing 
with the lawyer. Therefore, in proceedings against natural persons, documents that are 
voluntarily surrendered by the company or are confiscated from the company are gener-
ally usable and are not exempt from seizure.   
 
2. Limited Protection of Legal Entities  
 
Whether that also applies if proceedings are initiated against the company itself (Section 
30 of the Act on Regulatory Offences) or it is a third party recipient of items that were 
possibly gained from criminal actions (Section 73, Paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code), 
there is doubt in the literature83 and there are parallels drawn to defense documents that 
are also exempt from seizure when they are not in possession of the defense (Section 148, 
Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).84 The term defense documents is not 
only procedural, but it is materially defined with the consequence of a pre-effect before 
the initiation of an internal investigation.85  
 
For the latter opinion and also for the absolute protection of defense documents, there 
are good reasons86 for a concrete attorney-client relationship between counsel and a 
natural person. Such a far-reaching scope of privilege is not always justified due to dif-
ferences between a natural person and legal entity. Human dignity and the general right 
to personality are only attributable to natural persons. Therefore, legal entities do not 
enjoy constitutionally protected rights including the right against self-incrimination and 
a corresponding right to remain silent.87 Such a general right is not found in ordinary 
law. Section 444, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for formal !!!
82
  Schmitt, supra note 41, at § 53, No. 16 & § 97 No. 10b StPO. 
83
  Ballo, NZWiSt 46 (2013); Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis, supra note 2, at No. 49; Jahn & 
Kirsch, NZWiSt 28 (2013); Momsen & Grützner, DB 1792, 1796 (2011); Greeve, StraFo 89, 93 (2013). 
84
  Bock & Gerhold, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 5/42; Rütters & A. Schneider, GA 160, 164  
(2014); Schmitt, supra note 41, at § 148 StPO No. 8. 
85
  LG Gießen, Beschl. v. 25.6.2012 – 7 Qs 100/12 = wistra 2012, 409 f.; Greeve, StraFo 89, 95 (2013); Jahn & 
Kirsch, NZWiSt 28 (2013); Jahn, ZWH 1, 3, 5 (2013). 
86
  Whether they can convince is another question. The distinction between preparing the defense on the one 
hand and participation (aid or subsequent favoring) on the other hand will be precisely defined.  
87
  BVerfG, Beschl. v. 26.2.1997 – 1 BvR 2172/96, Rn. 85 = BVerfGE 95, 220; Fink, wistra 457 (2014); Bung, 
ZStW 125, 536, 349 (2013). 
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additional involvement (as well as the equality of the recovery and forfeiture parties, 
Sections 442, Paragraph 1 and Section 433 Paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure) with a defendant of equal protective effect, including for documents intended for 
defense against the threat of additional parties, but only first in the main trial stage.88 
Exactly which rights they are due in preceding stages of the trial is left open to determi-
nation. Here, protection against seizure (if this protection is possessed at all) is limited to 
documents in custody of the lawyer pursuant to Section 97 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.  
 
Indeed, the legislature is free to increase the protection of Section 433, Paragraph 1 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure to an investigation procedure. It can nevertheless be argued 
that criminal procedural means of coercion may be used against the later additional 
party so that a defensive need cannot consequently be denied. The expansion of statuto-
ry seizure prohibitions is given to case law in light of its effect on the quest for truth and 
only in compelling and exceptional cases. Something similar does not exist in relation to 
the seizure of documents from internal investigations, as the Basic Law does not even 
grant a right to remain silent to companies.  
 
The measures of forfeiture and recovery are not connected with a value judgment. For-
feiture is similar to the civil law institution of unjust enrichment. The prosecution must 
not only secure the forfeiture, which additionally serves the adverse party, but also the 
sources of information and evidence for its order. Since this has a privileged right of 
access pursuant to Section 406e of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then prohibiting 
the seizure of such company-owned documents would not work.  
 
Although there is no ethical value judgment against implementing a corporate fine, 
intent or at the very least negligence is required to impose such a fine according to Sec-
tion 10 of the Act on Regulatory Offences. In the case of Section 30 of the Act on Regu-
latory Offences, the company is not accused of its own “guilt”, but rather is attributed 
the inappropriate conduct of a specific representative. That expands the latitude of the 
legislature following Article 19, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law. Section 433, Paragraph 1 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure does not exceed this. The restriction made therein does 
not represent a drafting error. Rather, it represents a conscious decision by the legisla-
ture, as is also evident elsewhere. Section 81a, Paragraph 1 of the Act Against Restraints 
of Competition normalized an obligation to cooperate in actions relating to cartel of-
fenses, albeit only in relation to the principles of assessment of the legal consequences. 
 
Therefore, a reference point for the protection of the company from the seizure of doc-
uments originating in an internal investigation cannot be found in either constitutional !!!
88
  Jahn & Kirsch, in Criminal Compliance, supra note 2, at No. 33/107; Rütters & Schneider, GA 160, 162 
(2014). 
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or regular statutory law. As a result, nothing else applies for subsequent procedural stag-
es due to the limited protection of legal entities.  
 
3. Documents in Legal Custody 
 
Particularly controversial is the question of whether documents may be seized in a pro-
ceeding against a legal entity if those documents originated from a lawyer involved in an 
internal investigation. To this end, Section 97, Paragraph 1, Numbers 1 and 2 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure are useful, as they limit the ability to seize documents in 
relation to communication arising from the attorney-client relationship. However, the 
wording of Section 97, Paragraph 1, Number 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does 
not have this restriction. It is simply not possible to derive an unlimited seizure protec-
tion for all materials passed on to a lawyer.89 The very wording does not suggest an ar-
gumentum e contrario because it is linked with the term “other” in Section 97, Paragraph 
1, Number 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and builds on a provision that expressly 
limits the protection to information whose source is the accused. Protection extending 
beyond Section 97, Paragraph 1, Numbers 1 and 2 would be surprising if attached to 
Section 97, Paragraph 1, Number 3: the objects appearing under Section 97, Paragraph 1, 
Numbers 1 and 2 are much more clearly in need of confidentiality as the unnamed ob-
jects found under Section 97, Paragraph 1, Number 3. However, it cannot be concluded 
that the protection of written communication and records is determined solely by Sec-
tion 97, Paragraph 1, Numbers 1 and 2, as both provisions would lose any application 
from an expanding interpretation of Section 97, Paragraph 1, Number 3. It cannot be 
assumed that the legislature wanted to set up two never relevant rules or even over-
looked their redundancy. Accordingly, it follows that in proceedings against natural 
persons there is no freedom from seizure under Section 97, Paragraph 1 when docu-
ments from an internal investigation are in the hands of a corporate lawyer.90  
 
The freedom from seizure could result from the new Section 160a, Paragraph 1, Sentence 
1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in force since 2011), which includes all lawyers 
rather than just defense lawyers91 and prohibits investigative measures directed against 
them. However, Section 160a, Paragraph 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that 
Section 97 remains unaffected. The meaning of this provision does not reveal itself sole-
ly from the wording.  !!!
89
  Jahn & Kirsch, StV 151 (2011); Jahn, ZIS 453 (2011); Zerbes, ZStW 125, 551, 562 (2013); Erb, FS Kühne 171, 178, 
184 (2013). 
90
  LG Hamburg, Beschl. v. 15.10.2010 – 608 Qs 18/10 = wistra 192 (2011); Greeve, StraFo 89, 95 (2013); Bock 
&Gerhold, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 5/31; Grützner, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, supra 
note 23, at No. 4/432; Rödiger, supra note 43, at 315. 
91
  BVerfG, StraFo 2015, 61; LG Augsburg, Beschl. v. 2.4.2014 – 8 Ks 401 Js 139206/13, BeckRS 14588 (2014); 
Gutmann, FD-StrafR 362412 (2014). 
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Indeed, the grammatical interpretation permits the assumption that both provisions are 
valid side-by-side.92 Such an interpretation would occur even without a provision like 
Section 160a, Paragraph 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whose regulatory content 
is limited to a purely declaratory or clarifying function. To that effect, the limiting in-
terpretation leads one to believe that Section 160a, Paragraph 5 leaves untouched the 
seizure prohibition of Section 97,93 reduces only its scope, and does not attach any na-
ture of a demand. Contributing to legal clarity is an important and sometimes only task 
of a legal provision. But first there is the presumption that the legislature did not want 
to regulate with content. From a methodological perspective, this can be described as an 
important precept. The given presumption is refuted only if every attempt to interpret a 
provision in terms of meaningful regulatory content fails. The final interpretation 
would result in the adoption of a purely clarifying meaning.   
 
To regard Section 160a, Paragraph 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a mere declar-
atory norm would perhaps be plausible, but would require a clarification. If so, the legis-
lature could explain certain terms of Section 97 for further application (for example, the 
admissibility of the seizure where suspicion arises regarding complicity) and also deter-
mine which other variants of Section 97 are withdrawn under Section 160a. Unfortu-
nately, the legislature has not yet done this in terms of the entire Section 97. This full 
reference speaks in favor of a defined understanding of Section 160a, Paragraph 5 as 
determining Section 97 as an exception from Section 160a, Paragraph 1, Sentence 1: the 
freedom from seizure of documents from a lawyer is therefore directed to continue only 
in accordance with Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.94 Correspondingly, 
messages, records, and other items arising from the attorney-client relationship are pro-
tected to the lawyer. Findings from internal investigations do not originate from the 
defense or other mandate of individual defendants.    
 
After receipt of the release statement from the company, the lawyer that took over the 
internal investigation is obliged to give testimony or surrender items in proceedings 
against an employee or board member (Section 95 Code of Criminal Procedure). Rele-
vant documents may be confiscated from the lawyer if necessary. Consequently, Sec-!!!
92
  Sahan, in Criminal Compliance vor den Aufgaben der Zukunft, supra note 40, at 133, 142; LG Mannheim, 
Beschl. v. 3.7.2012 – 24 Qs 1 und 2/12 = wistra 400 (2012); de Lind van Wijngaarden & Egler, NJW 3549 
(2013); Schuster, NZWiSt 431 (2012); Ballo, NZWiSt 46 (2013); Greeve, StraFo 89, 95 (2013). 
93
  Bock & Gerhold, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 5/68. 
94
  Bauer, StraFo 488 (2012); Erb, FS Kühne 171, 175 (2013); Gädigk, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at 
18/31; Schmitt, supra note 41, at § 97 No. 10b & § 160a StPO No. 17; Wimmer, FS Imme Roxin 537, 545; 
Zerbes, ZStW 125, 551, 563 (2013); Minoggio, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Praxis, supra note 2, at No. 60; 
Knauer, ZWH 81, 88 (2012); Beckemper, in Internal Investigations, supra note 2, at No. 15/257; Mark, ZWH 
311, 312 (2012); Raum, StraFo 395, 399 (2012). 
!! COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 1   NUMBER 1   2015 
FOLKER BITTMANN  |  !INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS UNDER GERMAN LAW 
PAGE  101 
tions 97 and 160a, Paragraph 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure support the principle 
that a law firm has no shelter for delicate evidence.  
